America Invents Act: How It Affects Small Businesses by Vandenburg, Eric P.
Idaho Law Review
Volume 50 | Number 1 Article 8
April 2014
America Invents Act: How It Affects Small
Businesses
Eric P. Vandenburg
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Law Review by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric P. Vandenburg, America Invents Act: How It Affects Small Businesses, 50 Idaho L. Rev. 201 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review/vol50/iss1/8
AMERICA INVENTS ACT: HOW IT AFFECTS 
SMALL BUSINESSES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 201 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. PATENT LAW ........................ 203 
A. Constitutional Authority for Awarding Patent Rights ........................ 203 
B. Historical Overview on U.S. Patent Law: Who Is an “Inventor”? ..... 204 
III. THE AIA: FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE .................... 207 
A. Pertinent Provisions Undergoing Change .......................................... 207 
B. Challenges to America Invents Act .................................................... 209 
1. Policy Driven Arguments.............................................................. 209 
2. Constitutionality Arguments ......................................................... 212 
IV. HARMFUL EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESSES ................................. 217 
A.  Small Businesses and Innovation ...................................................... 217 
B. America Versus the Rest of the World ............................................... 218 
C. How First-to-File Will Hurt Small Entities ........................................ 219 
D. Caution from Canada ......................................................................... 220 
E. Lobbying the America Invents Act .................................................... 222 
F. AIA Mitigating Effects on Small Businesses ..................................... 224 
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 225 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclu-
sive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which 
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but 
the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, 
and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. 
Thomas Jefferson
1
 
 
On September 16, 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was 
signed into law, bringing with it what many consider the most significant change to 
the Patent Act since 1952.
2
 While the Act brings about many changes to the current 
patent law system, the most substantial change is the demise of what has been long 
seen as the uniquely American approach to patent law—the “first-to-invent” system 
of patent priority.
3
 This bipartisan bill, which effectively switched America’s patent 
                                                          
 
 1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907), available at 
https://www.archive.org/stream/writingsofthomas1314jeff#page/n9/mode/2up. 
 2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“An Act To 
amend title 35, United States Code, to provide for patent reform.”). 
 3. See id. at § 3; see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 
20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 529, 548 n.38 (1998) (“At the end of 1997, there were two nations that 
used the so-called first-to-invent system: the United States and the Philippines. Effective January 1, 1998, 
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system from “first-to-invent” (FTI) to “first-to-file” (FTF), has created a broad di-
vide in our country, one that transgresses even political party allegiances, between 
those who tout the efficiency and global patent harmonization that comes with FTF 
and those who strongly oppose FTF, arguing that it is unconstitutional.
4
 
Detractors primarily attack the constitutionality of the FTF system by alleging 
that Congress exceeded its mandate when it passed the Act.
5
 In fact, parties had 
already challenged the constitutionality of the AIA during the eighteen-month peri-
od before its effective date of March 16, 2013.
6
 The FTI advocates support their 
argument by looking to the history and tradition of United States patent law, which 
awards patents to the “first and true inventor.”7 They argue that not only is Con-
gress contravening the long history of U.S. patent law by awarding patents to the 
filer, but this would also arguably violate the intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion.
8
 
On the other hand, proponents of FTF interpret the framers’ intent another 
way and argue that there is no express language written in the constitution that re-
quires the patent be given to the first inventor, as opposed to any inventor.
9
 They 
bolster this argument by suggesting that the first-to-file system would actually be 
more effective at carrying out the purpose of the patent clause, to grant an incentive 
for inventors who promptly file their patent so the public may benefit from the dis-
closure, by “promot[ing] rapidity of public disclosure.”10 
While there is no doubt that keeping Congress within its mandated powers is 
the primary reason for challenging the constitutionality of the AIA, there is also a 
very important policy reason to challenge the AIA: the negative impact a weakened 
grace period will have on startups, small businesses, and individual inventors.
11
 
Preventing this negative impact on small businesses and inventors is of the utmost 
importance because “[s]mall businesses are the backbone of the U.S. economy[] 
and the primary source of jobs for Americans.”12 The change from first-to-invent to 
                                                                                                                                       
under its Republic Act No. 8293, the Philippines adopted a first-to-file system, leaving the United States 
alone in the world in adhering to a first-to-invent system.”). 
 4. Under the current U.S. patent priority system, patent rights are awarded to the person who 
can show he or she was the first to invent the idea in question regardless of who filed first with the patent 
office.  Under the first-to-file system, it does not matter who was the first to invent. Rather, whichever 
person is fastest in writing an application and submitting it to the patent office gets the patent rights. Doug 
Harvey, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the 
Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1136–37 (2006). 
 5. Id. at 1143–44. 
    6.     Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–23MAP, 
2013 WL 3155280 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013) (filed July 18, 2012); see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).  
     7. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790), available at 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf (“An act to promote the 
progress of useful Arts”) (repealed 1973). 
   8.   Harvey, supra note 4, at 1144. 
    9. First-to-File v. First-to-Invent: A Bone of Contention in the International Harmonization 
of U.S. Patent Law, SHELDON MAK ROSE & ANDERSON, 
http://www.usip.com/pdf/Article_Patents/1st2fil.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  
 10. Id. 
 11. Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and Weakens In-
centives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29, 72 (2013). 
 12. Small Business, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
topics/small-business (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
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first-to-file gives large corporations, which have more resources such as in house 
counsel and available capital, an advantage because it is easier for a large corpora-
tion to file a patent application before an individual inventor, even if the large cor-
poration is not the first inventor.
13
   
This article focuses on the changes the AIA brings to the patent industry and 
the effects it will have on small businesses and inventors. In particular, this article 
emphasizes how the changes will disadvantage these small entities and advantage 
the large corporations. Part II provides a history of patent law in the U.S..
14
 Specifi-
cally, it follows the consistent definition of who is an “inventor” under the U.S. 
Constitution.
15
 Part III compares the language of the current patent system and the 
new system under the AIA.
16
 This analysis is narrowed specifically to language 
changing to a first-to-file system and the arguments for and against the switch from 
first-to-file.
17
 Part IV analyzes the harmful effects that the AIA will have on small 
companies and inventors regarding the first-to-file provision.
18
 Finally, Part V will 
conclude and suggest ways that small companies and inventors can mitigate the 
likely harm they are going to experience.
19
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. PATENT LAW 
A. Constitutional Authority for Awarding Patent Rights 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 
United States Constitution.
20
 
 
By their very nature, ideas, as Thomas Jefferson noted, “freely spread from 
one to another . . . incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.”21 Thus, 
because inventions are ideas, they “cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”22 
                                                          
 13. Letter from Todd O. McCracken, President, Nat’l Small Bus. Ass’n to Susy Tsang-Foster, 
Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Admin. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/nsba_20121005.pdf (“By repealing the invention date as the 
priority date, compared to prior art, the AIA will dramatically increase the pressure on small businesses to 
establish filing date priority and require them to file more frequently and at every stage of development 
without the opportunity to perfect their inventions. The costs of these filings (including the hiring of patent 
attorneys, new patenting costs, etc.) and the considerable amount of time involved with more frequent 
invention reviews, preparation and related filings will be felt most strongly by the small business communi-
ty. Large, multinational corporations have the resources to file more applications quicker and earlier in the 
development process and will have a disproportionate advantage over their independent and smaller coun-
terparts. The implementation of this rule will deliver a critical blow to small-business patentees and place 
them at a significant disadvantage in the patenting process.”).  
 14. See infra part II. 
 15. See infra part II. 
 16. See infra part III. 
 17. See infra part III. 
 18. See infra part IV. 
 19. See infra part V. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 21. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 334. 
 22. Id. 
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Therefore, society must set up a system to “give an exclusive right to the profits 
arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce 
utility” for the benefit of society.23 While other nations thought that “these mo-
nopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society,” our founders 
thought that this quid pro quo system of exclusive rights in ideas in exchange for 
public disclosure was important enough to include in the Constitution.
24
 Now, the 
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to inventors 
for their discoveries.
25
  
Importantly, under this quid pro quo system of awarding patents, the “reward 
to the owner [is] a secondary consideration.”26 Rather, the primary policy reason 
for granting patents “is to bring new designs and technologies into the public do-
main through disclosure.”27 While there is a rich history of legislation and case law 
on various aspects of the patent clause, such as what temporal period qualifies as 
“limited times,”28 the strand of case law and legislative history this section of the 
article is concerned with is the question of who is an “inventor”? 
B. Historical Overview on U.S. Patent Law: Who Is an “Inventor”? 
Given that historically the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then 
such tradition may suggest a constitutionally rooted requirement that 
would preclude a first to file system and thus thwart harmonization efforts. 
Timothy R. Holbrook
29
 
 
The beginning of understanding U.S. patent law, understandably, comes from 
looking to English patent law at the time of the construction of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.
30
 However, it is the English law’s flaws that inspired America’s patent system. 
English common law did not recognize property rights in the mind-work of the 
inventor.
31
 Patents were simply viewed as “a grant” issuing solely from “royal fa-
vor” rather than the property in the inventor’s intellectual labor.32 This is common-
ly referred to as the distinction between a “societal right,” or one given by some 
authority, versus a “moral right,” or one earned through mental labor and work. 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 27. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
 28. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (amending the term of patent protection from 17 years to 
20 years); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (holding that Congress did not exceed its 
mandated power by setting the “limited time” period for copyrights at seventy years). 
 29. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the 
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (Timothy Holbrook is an 
assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and this article was presented at the symposium 
entitled Patent Law, Social Policy, and Public Interest: The Search for a Balanced Global Patent System, 
hosted by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law). 
 30. Edward C. Waltershceid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents 
(Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 699 (1994) (“It is not surprising that the United States 
in developing its own law pertaining to property right in invention should look to the law pertaining to the 
patent privilege in England.”). 
 31. McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 418 (1878). 
 32. Id. at 420. 
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While English law applied the “societal right” in patents, the U.S. law, on the con-
trary, recognizes in the clearest terms the mind-work that we term inventions.
33
 
Thus, this adoption of “moral rights” being grounds for patent issuance and secur-
ing to inventors exclusive rights, while founded on English common law, is in 
many ways uniquely American.
34
 As Daniel Webster stated while in the House of 
Representatives in 1824, “the right of the inventor” is “the fruit of his mind—it 
belongs to him more than any other property—he does not inherit it—he takes it by 
no man’s gift—it peculiarly belongs to him, and he ought to be protected in the 
enjoyment of it.”35 Moreover, not only did England not give moral rights in patents, 
but essentially no other European patent practices or laws were known to those 
responsible for creating the first patent law of the U.S.
36
 Therefore, the framers of 
the Constitution created a uniquely American patent law system by rejecting the 
common law of England and all of Europe by awarding patent rights to the inven-
tor’s mind-work rather than societal awards to the royally favored. 
Not only was the Constitution written to give the inventor rights in patents, 
but in 1790, Congress enacted the first patent act, which authorized patents for any 
person who “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, 
or device . . . not before known or used.”37 While Congress amended this Act in 
1793, the pertinent language regarding an inventor did not materially change.
38
 
This language is consistent with the definition of an “invent[o]r” at that time: 
“[o]ne who produces something new; a devi[s]er of [s]omething not known be-
fore.”39 The language used in these statutes and the understood definition of an 
inventor during the drafting of these statutes clearly shows that an inventor must 
make a genuine discovery, and not simply win a race to file at the patent office. 
Further support regarding what constitutes an inventor can be found in the provi-
sion providing for a repeal of a patent if “it shall appear that the patentee was not 
the first and true inventor or discoverer.”40 Thus, the language of the original Pa-
tent Acts supports the first-to-invent system as the only constitutionally allowed 
system in the U. S. because only the first and true inventor can gain patent rights. 
While there has been subsequent legislation amending the original Patent 
Acts of 1790 and 1793, none of this legislation affected the language that gives 
inventors the right to their inventions.
41
 In 1836, Congress passed legislation that 
reformed patent law by establishing the U.S. Patent Office to review patents instead 
                                                          
 33. Id. 
 34. Walterscheid, supra note 30, at 698. 
 35. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824). 
 36. Walterscheid, supra note 30, at 698. 
 37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (emphasis added) (“An Act to promote the 
progress of the useful Arts”) (capitalization as in original). 
 38. Patent Act of 1973, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (“An act to promote the progress of useful 
Arts; and to repeal the act heretofore made for that purpose”). The language regarding an inventor simply 
changed to “not known or used before.”). 
 39. See generally John Walker, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (R.C. Alston) (1791) 
(emphasis added). 
 40. Patent Act of 1973, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109 (emphasis added). 
 41. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2194 (2011) (“Although much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since the first Pa-
tent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right to patent their inventions has not.”). 
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of courts, instituting the “novelty” requirement for patents, codifying the statutory 
bars, and clarifying the law for cases of conflicting patents.
42
 However, this legisla-
tion had no effect on the language defining an inventor.
43
 The next laws regarding 
patents were passed in 1839 and created a grace period of two years for publication 
or use of the invention by the inventor before filing the application.
44
 However, this 
was later shortened to a one-year grace period in 1939, which is what the grace 
period still is today.
45
 The most recent patent law overhaul occurred in 1952, and 
while it made many slight changes to the law, the two major changes made require 
that an invention be nonobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art and to 
codify a definition and penalties for infringement.
46
 Thus, while Congress has 
passed much legislation regarding patent law in the U.S. since the Patent Acts of 
1790 and 1793, none of this legislation has changed the tenet that original inventors 
have the exclusive right to patent their respective inventions.
47
 
Additionally, judicial support for the definition of inventor as the first-to-
invent can be found in the courts’ historical construction of the word.48 As early as 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts held that the property right in an 
invention vested in the inventor “from the moment of invention” and the process of 
obtaining a patent “only perfected” that right.49 As a district court judge said in 
1826, “[i]t is very true that ‘the right to a patent belongs to him who is the first in-
ventor, even before the patent is granted.’ That is, none but the first inventor can 
have a patent.”50 As these district court decisions show, the patent is simply a for-
mal step one must make to publish their rights in their invention and subsequently 
benefit from a right to exclude others from using the invention. Even the Supreme 
Court adopted this view of patent law, that “the right is created by the invention, 
and not by the patent.”51 This viewpoint of rights to an invention vesting in the first 
inventor, and not the first filer, is a recurring theme throughout the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.52 The Supreme Court recently affirmed this history of patents 
                                                          
 42. A Brief History of the Patent Law of The United States, LADAS & PARRY LLP, 
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839) (“An act in addition to An act to promote 
the progress of the useful arts”). 
 45. Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (1939) (“An act to amend sections 4886, 
4887, 4920, and 4929 of the Revised Statutes, (U.S.C., title 35, secs. 31, 32, 69, and 73)”). 
 46. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (“An act to revise and codify the laws relat-
ing to patents and the Patent Office, and to enact into law title 35 of the United States Code entitled Pa-
tents”). 
 47. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 131 S. Ct. at 2194–95. 
 48. See id. at 2190 (“Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an in-
vention belong to the inventor.” Id.). 
 49. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813), aff’d, 13 U.S. 199 (1815). 
 50. Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826). 
 51. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7 (1829) (emphasis in original). 
 52. See Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 319 (1833) (holding that “it clearly appears, that it was the 
intention of the legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive right in the 
inventor only.”); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850) (“[T]he discoverer of a new and 
useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclusive use, which he may perfect and 
make absolute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.”); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 
342, 346 (1890) (“[W]hatever invention [an inventor] may thus conceive and perfect is his individual prop-
erty.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933) (noting that an inventor owns 
“the result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea . . . the product of original thought . . .”). 
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rights vesting to the first inventor in 2011 by acknowledging that their “precedents 
confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.”53 
As over two centuries of court decisions and legislative language demon-
strate, the Constitution defines an inventor as the first to discover rather than first to 
file; and thus, the Constitution requires a first-to-invent rather than a first-to-file 
system.
54
 In light of this consistent legislative language and court interpretations, it 
is clear that the grant of exclusive rights is one given to the individual who is the 
true and first inventor, and any first-to-file system flies in the face of what the Con-
stitution mandates.
55
 Not only does this long history suggest a constitutional bar 
against a first-to-file system, but “the lack of historical precedent for [Congress’s 
action]” with respect to the reciprocal viewpoint is also arguably “the most telling 
indication of the severe constitutional problem.”56 Thus, legislative history and over 
200 years of courts’ interpretation strongly suggests that the Constitution requires a 
first-to-invent system rather than a first-to-file scheme. 
III. THE AIA: FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE 
A. Pertinent Provisions Undergoing Change 
In shifting from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, the America In-
vents Act contradicts both the text and the historical understanding of the 
Copyright and Patent Clause in the Constitution. 
Adam Mossoff
57
 
 
As previously discussed, the AIA is making sweeping changes to the current 
American patent law system by switching from the long followed first-to-invent 
system to the first-to-file system of awarding priority rights in patent applications.
58
 
This change should harmonize the U.S. patent system with global patent systems.
59
 
                                                          
 53. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2195 (2011). 
 54. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the 
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (“Given that historically 
the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then such tradition may suggest a constitutionally rooted 
requirement that would preclude a first to file system and thus thwart harmonization . . . .”). 
 55. Michael A. Glenn & Peter J. Nagle, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform 
or Doublespeak?, 50 IDEA 441, 461–462. (2010) (“It is clear that the patent grant was never intended to be 
a race to the U.S. patent office, a race in which the legions of fleet-footed lawyers in the pay of powerful 
market forces are sure to win. The Article I grant is an individual right granted to the true and first inventor 
and the Constitution does not support a tortured interpretation urged by proponents of a first inventor to file 
system.”). 
 56. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010) (quot-
ing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667, 669 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J. 
dissenting)). 
 57. Adam Mossoff, The First-to-File Provision in H.R. 1249 is Unconstitutional: A Textual and 
Historical Analysis, LAW.ASU.EDU, 3 (2011) 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/Patent/MossoffHR1249Unconstitutional(2011).pdf. 
 58. See 157 CONG. REC. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana 
Rohrabacher). 
 59. See id. 
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Prior to the passing of the AIA, the Patent Act explicitly awarded rights in an in-
vention to the first inventor by stating: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented 
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or… 
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or 
(g)(1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 
135 or section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the 
extent permitted in section 104, that before such person's invention thereof 
the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person's invention thereof, the 
invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention 
under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective 
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the 
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
60
 
Courts have consistently interpreted this language in the Patent Act to give 
priority of invention “to the first party to [1] reduce an invention to practice unless 
[2] the other party can show that it was the first to conceive of the invention and 
that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.”61 
However, Section 3 of the AIA not only deletes Section 102(f) and (g) regarding 
priority, but also changes the language of Section 102(a) of the Patent Act to award 
the first filer by changing the language to the following: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, 
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the ef-
fective filing date of the claimed invention; or 
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 
151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under 
section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, 
names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention.
62
 
As the language of Section 3 of the AIA shows, all references to the invention 
date in the Patent Act of 1952 have now been removed and effectively replaced 
with a focus on the effective filing date.
63
 Thus, any patent application filed after 
the effective date of March 16, 2013 is now given a priority date of its filing date, 
                                                          
 60. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (f), (g) (2012) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2013)) (em-
phasis added). 
 61. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 62. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 2, §3, at 285–86 (emphasis added). 
 63. Daniel J. Sherwinter & Patrick M. Boucher, The America Invents Act, 41 COLO. LAW. 47, 
49–50 (2012). 
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and priority between conflicting applications is now determined by the filing date 
rather than the invention date.
64
 However, before this occurs, the AIA must first 
pass the test presented by pending cases that challenge the constitutionality of the 
first-to-file scheme and examine the various legal and policy driven arguments on 
both sides of the divide.
65
 
B. Challenges to America Invents Act 
1. Policy Driven Arguments 
 The main reason, purpose, and motivation the proponents of the AIA have for 
passing the legislation “is to harmonize our law, American patent law, with Eu-
rope.”66 The reason international harmonization in patent law is so attractive is to 
“simplify and expedite an inventor’s ability to obtain worldwide patent protection” 
and strengthen that protection.
67
 Additionally, this harmonization will allegedly 
reduce costs of applying for, defending, and enforcing patents internationally, and 
will simplify the patent rules.
68
 However, opponents of the AIA view this “harmo-
nization” as another word for “succumbing to peer pressure” and wonder why, if 
American law has always been stronger in this area, we must harmonize or weaken 
our patent system.
69
 Indeed, the argument that this harmonization will weaken our 
patent system finds strength in the statement made by the European Union in 2011 
regarding how it is facing an “innovation emergency” in science and industry and is 
still trailing far behind the U.S.
70
 While there is no doubt that this international 
harmonization “will be more beneficial to large, multinational corporations,” it 
does not necessarily follow that this harmonization will be better for the American 
innovation and patent industry.
71
 
Another frequently used argument in favor of passing the AIA and a first-to-
file system is to simplify the complex system in place for interference proceed-
ings.72 An interference proceeding, under the former system, is where the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences determines questions of priority for conflicting 
patent applications and subsequently issues a patent to the applicant who is ad-
judged the prior inventor.
73
 As Congressman Smith, one of the co-sponsors of the 
                                                          
 64. See id. 
 65. See, e.g., Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–
23MAP, 2013 WL 3155280 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013). 
 66. 157 Cong. Rec. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher). 
 67. Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the 
United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687, 692 (1993). 
 68. Id. at 693. 
 69. Gary M. Lauder, Patently Absurd or: How to Go From the World’s Best Patent System to 
Worst-Than-Most in a Single Step, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2011),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-lauder/patently-absurd-or-how-to_b_832703.html [hereinafter Patent-
ly Absurd]; 157 CONG. REC. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher). 
 70. Raf Casert, EU Warns It Lags Behind in Global Innovation Race, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb 1, 
2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2014097347_apeueuinnovation.html. 
 71. Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United 
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and Adminis-
trative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 765 (2006). 
  72.  See 157 Cong. Rec. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith). 
 73. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2012) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §135(a) (West 2013)). 
210 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, put it: “the current system lulls inventors into a 
false sense of security based on the belief that they can readily and easily rely on 
being the first-to-invent,” but these inventors forget “they must comply with the 
complex legal procedures…” to win an interference proceeding.74 Congressman 
Smith argues that the former patent system’s costly and complex process truly hurts 
small inventors because they commonly lose their patent rights in these expensive 
battles over ownership.
75
 In support of these claims, he stated that “[i]n the last 7 
years…only one independent inventor out of 3 million patent applications has 
proved an earlier date of invention over the inventor who filed first.”76 
While this may be true, comparing the amount of number of successful inter-
ference contests with the number of patents issued does not accurately depict the 
small inventor’s chances of winning an interference. When considering just inter-
ference contests, research shows that roughly 40% of these small parties did in fact 
beat the larger parties.
77
 Indeed, this research suggests that small entities neither 
gain nor lose on average from using the interference system.
78
 Thus, while parties 
may not often challenge priority, actual litigation statistics show that when priority 
is challenged, the smaller inventor does not have a disadvantage in the priority pro-
ceedings.
79
 
Proponents of the bill also claim that first-to-file will “simplify the patent ap-
plication system and provide increased certainty to businesses that they can com-
mercialize a patent that has been granted.”80 This certainty is accomplished because 
once a patent is issued, the inventor no longer has to worry about priority and can 
simply rely on the first filing date and move forward, which will allegedly help 
“raise capital, grow businesses, and create jobs.”81 While this may be true, there is 
too large an emphasis placed on this argument. Though this argument trumpets 
saving “significant time and money” on these disputes, it fails to account for the 
                                                          
 74. 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-file, Mandatory Reexamination, and 
Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas for Better? Or Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 595, 602 (1987) (“Thus, considering all of the statistics concerning Board decisions as a whole, 
priority was awarded to the junior party, in whole or in part, in 42.7 percent of the cases.”); Mark A. Lem-
ley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 
1309 (2003).  
 78. See Banner & McDonnell, supra note 77, at 602; Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1309. 
 79. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to 
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 430 (2002). 
TABLE 6. Small Entities Advantaged and Disadvantaged by the First-to-Invent System FY 1983-2000 
Small Entities   Advantaged Disadvantaged 
Independent Inventors 98 115 
Small Businesses 83 75 
Nonprofit Institutions 22 11 
Total 203 201 
 
 80. 157 CONG. REC. S1089-01 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 81. Id. 
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reality that “the percentage of patent applications that involve a priority dispute is 
quite small.”82 Thus, because there are such a small amount of priority disputes, the 
amount of time and money spent on them cannot be that significant; yet the value 
of having priority disputes can be invaluable for parties who can show priority. 
Although there are only a small number of priority disputes, it is unreasonable to do 
away with priority disputes just for the sake of clarity. That would be along the 
same lines of an argument that, because there are only a small number of infringe-
ment cases, they are unimportant as well.
83
 Therefore, although patent priority suits 
may be costly, the small amount of them does not make that argument as signifi-
cant as AIA proponents would like to think it is. The loss in having the option to 
litigate patent priority suits would in fact be a bigger loss than any loss seen in 
money and time spent on these proceedings because the option of having priority 
disputes available is more important in “determining who gets a patent.”84 
On the other side of the argument regarding the passing of the AIA is the in-
teresting notion that giving the first filer priority may create patent applications that 
are incomplete or poorly drafted in order to be the first filer. The importance of this 
argument stems from the idea that an efficient patent system depends on the 
amount and quality of its patents.
85
 Under the first-to-file system, the number of 
applications and speed in which these applications are filed will increase substan-
tially while the quality of these patents will decrease.
86
 For example, the Japanese 
first-to-file patent system has over five times as many applications filed annually 
than does the U.S. system.
87
 While other factors could explain this difference in 
number of applications, the first-to-file standard is certainly a significant factor. 
The large number of applications filed in Japan and the corresponding decline in 
patent application quality demonstrate what could be in store for America under a 
first-to-file system.
88
 Subsequently, practicing lawyers “fear that this decline in 
quality will have a detrimental effect on future scientific development.”89 
Perhaps the strongest argument against the first-to-file provision of the AIA is 
the negative effects of the “race to the office” on small inventors and businesses. 
As small businesses stated in a letter to the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO): 
                                                          
 82. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331. 
 83. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331. Indeed, “[t]he data suggests that interferences are 
litigated to judgment in about the same percentage of applications as infringement suits are litigated to 
judgment once a patent issues.” Id. at 1308. Thus, “[o]ne cannot say that the small number of priority dis-
putes does not matter anymore than one would argue that litigated cases of infringement do not matter to 
the patent system.” Id. at 1331; see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001). 
 84. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331. 
 85. Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Stand-
ard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 573–74 (1988) (“The efficiency of 
any system depends upon the quantity and quality of the applications filed.”). 
 86. Id. at 573 (“Under a first-to-file system, it would become even more important for an inven-
tor to establish a priority date by quickly filing an application. Thus, practitioners predict that the number of 
applications filed at [the] Patent Office would increase in quantity and decrease in quality under a first-to-
file system.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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By repealing the invention date as the priority date, compared to prior art, 
the AIA will dramatically increase the pressure on small businesses to es-
tablish filing date priority and require them to file more frequently and at 
every stage of development without the opportunity to perfect their inven-
tions. The costs of these filings . . . and the considerable amount of time 
involved with more frequent invention reviews, preparation and related fil-
ings will be felt most strongly by the small business community. Large, 
multinational corporations have the resources to file more applications 
quicker and earlier in the development process and will have a dispropor-
tionate advantage over their independent and smaller counterparts. The 
implementation of this rule will deliver a critical blow to small-business 
patentees and place them at a significant disadvantage in the patenting 
process.
90
 
This argument, while certainly worth mentioning and briefly describing here, 
will be addressed in full detail later in this article.
91
 
In conclusion, the policy arguments in favor of switching to a first-to-file sys-
tem seem to favor one group of people: large corporations. Indeed, large interna-
tional corporations benefit from harmonizing the U.S. patent system with the global 
patent systems and removing interference provisions to award patent rights to the 
company that can most quickly file patents. However, not only will the race to the 
patent office likely reduce the quality of patents awarded, but it will also signifi-
cantly disfavor small businesses as will be discussed.
92
 Finally, the strongest argu-
ment against the passing of the America Invents Act is the constitutionality of hav-
ing a first-to-file system.
93
 
2. Constitutionality Arguments 
The Patents and Copyrights clause located in Article 1, section 8 of the Unit-
ed States Constitution is “both a grant of power and a limitation.”94 However, Con-
gress may not “overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional pur-
pose,” and it cannot enlarge the monopoly “without regard to innovation, advance-
ment or social benefit gained thereby.”95 However, the AIA seeks to overreach 
those restraints by ignoring the fact that “inventor means first inventor in the Con-
stitution.”96 As recent as 2011, none other than the Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court, John Roberts, stated that “[s]ince 1790, the patent law has 
operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor,” and that 
“[a]lthough much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since 
the first Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right to patent their inven-
                                                          
 90. McCracken, supra note 13, at 3 (“The National Small Business Association (NSBA) is the 
nation’s older nonpartisan small business advocacy organization, with more than 65,000 small business 
member in virtually every industry across the country.”).  
 91. See infra Part IV. 
 92. See infra Part IV. 
 93. See supra Part I.A–B; infra Part III.B.2. 
 94. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
 95. Id. at 5–6. 
 96. 157 CONG. REC. H4422 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner). 
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tions has not.”97 The AIA implements language98 inconsistent with both the long 
history of awarding rights to the first and only inventor
99
 and the idea that the rights 
protected by our patent system are pre-existing rights. 
Proponents of the America Invents Act argue that the first-to-file provision is 
constitutional because an applicant still must be a “bona fide inventor to qualify” 
for patent rights.
100
 Suggesting that by requiring that an applicant be a bona fide 
inventor, the AIA establishes a “first-inventor-to-file” standard and will not simply 
allow an applicant to steal an invention.
101
 These proponents argue that the first-
inventor-to-file system fits within the constitution’s meaning because it requires 
any subsequent inventor “to have come up with the idea independently and sepa-
rately.”102 
However, not only is the first-inventor-to-file justification inconsistent with 
over 200 years of law,
103
 but it also flies in the face of the actual text of the Patents 
Clause. The Patents Clause expressly states that it promotes the progress of science 
and useful arts by “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”104 This language of “se-
curing” inventors rights to their respective “discoveries” suggests that the right is a 
pre-existing right that a patent ensures, and not a right that is granted by the patent. 
In 1972, Joseph Barnes explained in one of the earliest treatises on patents how pre-
existing rights exist under the language of securing: 
[A] system for securing property in the products of genius is a mutual con-
tract between the inventor and the public, in which the inventor agrees, on 
proviso that the public will secure to him his property in, and the exclusive 
use of his discovery for a limited time, he will, at the expiration of such 
time, cede his right in the same to the public . . . .
105
 
Additional support for this strict textualist view of the Patent Clause comes 
from the fact that the drafters of the Constitution were former British subjects.
106
 
Under the English Crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the courts 
made a practice of granting monopolies to “court favorites in goods or businesses 
which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”107 Looking at the drafters of 
                                                          
 97. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2192–94 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 98. See supra Part III.A. 
 99. See supra Part II.B. 
 100. 157 CONG. REC. H4422 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at H4423. 
 103. See supra Part II.B. 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 105. Jonathan S. Massey, Why First To File Is Unconstitutional, in WHY H.R. 1249 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 1, available at http://docs.piausa.org/112th-Congress%20(2011-
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2013). Interestingly, Jonathan Massey is the attorney for the recently dismissed case challenging the consti-
tutionality of the AIA in Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–
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the Constitution and their desire to end monopoly granting in established products, 
it is clear that they chose the language “securing” to show that the rights do in fact 
vest upon the inventing, and not the granting, of the patent as the AIA imple-
ments.
108
 Thus, when viewing the text of the Patent Clause and its drafters’ histori-
cal background, it is clear that the strict textualist approach of those who “view the 
first-to-file system as unconstitutional appear to have the better argument.”109 
In contrast, proponents of the first-to-file system also look to judicial prece-
dent to argue that U.S. courts have long recognized that a second inventor may be 
awarded a patent under certain circumstances.
110
 The first Supreme Court case to 
award patent rights to a second inventor was Gayler v. Wilder in 1850.
111
 There, the 
Court gave the patent rights to the second inventor because the first inventor had 
not made his idea public.
112
 The Court held that “by knowledge and use the legisla-
ture meant knowledge and use existing in a manner accessible to the public.”113 The 
Court reasoned that although an inventor may not be “strictly speaking the first and 
original inventor,” the legislature meant to secure rights for inventors who made 
“knowledge and use exist[] in a manner accessible to the public.”114 There is a line 
of case law following this reasoning since the Gayler v. Wilder decision.
115
 Howev-
er, these cases are all decided under the same exception, or justification, to award 
patent rights to the second inventor.
116
 These cases, the only cases that award patent 
rights to the second inventor, all allow the second inventor to have priority because 
“the inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and 
exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not 
within the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress.”117 Except for 
these cases, which reinforce the Patent Act’s primary policy of public disclosure, 
the second inventor never gets priority over the first inventor. Thus, any attempt to 
glean support from this line of cases is without merit as the AIA simply gives the 
first filer priority regardless of whether the first party was in fact suppressing or 
concealing his invention or actively trying to reduce it to practice. 
However, those in favor of the first-inventor-to-file system do make some 
very compelling policy arguments that are compatible with Congress’ constitution-
al limitations. They argue that the patent policy in the Constitution is to in fact 
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promote the science by bringing new ideas into the public domain.
118
 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has said that, according to the Constitution, the reason for securing 
these limited exclusive rights, or the “the reward,” is to gain the “advantage[] de-
rived by the public” by getting access to new forms of important knowledge.119 
These rewards in exclusive rights are simply given to the owner as “a secondary 
consideration,” and were considered by our founders to be a necessary embarrass-
ment.
120
 By having the progress of science as the main purpose of the Patents 
Clause, it seems that the first-to-file standard does a better job of accomplishing 
this purpose, as it compels disclosure to the public as fast as possible to gain priori-
ty rights. 
Nonetheless, this argument fails to address the consequences of encouraging 
speed. While giving priority to the first inventor does encourage faster disclosure to 
the public, this also encourages poor quality in patent applications.
121
 These poten-
tially sloppy disclosures, made in haste to gain priority, will likely result in rejected 
applications with insufficient claims.
122
 In light of these insufficient claims, inven-
tors will make patentable improvements to the claims. However, these improve-
ments will likely be unprofitable because they will be easily discoverable through 
now obvious research.
123
 Conversely, the first-to-file system encourages more care 
because inventors know that they need only show progress to reduce the invention 
to practice and that careful drafting of applications will reduce the chances of the 
claims being found invalid during the prosecution process and any potential litiga-
tion.
124
 Therefore, the argument that a first-to-file system would be better for the 
policy of compelling public disclosure is misplaced, as it will in fact diminish the 
quality of and bog down our patent system. 
While there are many arguments in favor of the current first-to-invent system, 
one compelling argument may cause courts to uphold the constitutionality of the 
AIA. Generally, the Supreme Court provides Congress a very wide birth when leg-
islating under the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the Constitution.
125
 In Golan v. 
Holder, the Court upheld the constitutionality of provisions in the Uruguay Round 
Amendments Act of 1994, which granted U.S. copyrights to foreign works former-
ly unprotected in the U.S.
126
 The Court reasoned that “[g]iven the authority we hold 
Congress has, we will not second-guess the political choice Congress made be-
tween leaving the public domain untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”127 
Another example in the realm of copyright law comes from Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
where the Court held that extending copyright protection to the life of the author 
                                                          
 118. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he ulti-
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 119. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832). 
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plus seventy years did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights 
may only endure for limited times.
128
 Again, the Court reasoned that the legislative 
authority conferred on Congress by the Copyright Clause requires the Court to “de-
fer substantially to Congress.”129 
This substantial deference given to Congress by the Supreme Court has also 
been seen in many patent law cases.
130
 In the landmark patent law case of Graham 
v. John Deere Co., the Court held that “[w]ithin the limits of the constitutional 
grant, the Congress may . . . implement the stated purpose of the Framers by select-
ing the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”131 This 
power also extends to “set[ting] out conditions and tests for patentability.”132 In-
deed, this deference to Congress with respect to the Patents Clause was established 
as far back as 1843 in McClurg v. Kingsland, where the Court noted “the powers of 
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Con-
stitution, and . . . there are no restraints on its exercise . . . .”133 Thus, it seems that 
the Supreme Court will likely have a strong inclination to not interfere with Con-
gress’ choice to pass the AIA. 
However, the fact remains that the text, the policy arguments, and 220 years 
of law suggest that first-to-file should not be upheld as constitutional.
134
 After all, 
judicial “deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in 
matters of law.”135 Indeed, this seemingly obvious unconstitutional provision of the 
AIA might rise to the level warned about in Marbury v. Madison: “The powers of 
the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, 
or forgotten, the constitution is written.”136 The first-to-file standard does seem to 
forget the language of the Patents Clause, and it is not only within the courts discre-
tion to strike down unconstitutional provisions, but in fact “there can be no ques-
tion that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power 
by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits.”137 While most peo-
ple agree that something needs to be done about the problems inherent in our patent 
system, the AIA is not the correct means to go about solving the problems, as it 
would in fact make a larger problem. Fixing these small problems may substantiate 
the famous quote that “[m]ost problems begin as solutions.”138 If litigation chal-
lenging the first-to-file provision of the AIA reaches the Supreme Court, they will 
have to decide the question: Is the AIA constitutional, or did Congress jump onto 
the wrong solution because the problems with the current patent system were very 
relevant? 
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IV. HARMFUL EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESSES 
A.  Small Businesses and Innovation 
From the mom-and-pop storefront shops that anchor Main Street to the 
high-tech startups that keep America on the cutting edge, small businesses 
are the backbone of our economy and the cornerstones of our Nation’s 
promise. 
President Barack Obama
139
 
 
There is no doubt that “[s]mall businesses are the backbone of the U.S. econ-
omy, and the primary source of jobs for Americans.”140 Indeed, as congressional 
opponents of the AIA brought to light, the facts about small businesses in the 2007 
fiscal year are as follows: they represent 99.7% of all employer firms; employ just 
over half of all private sector employees; generated 64% of new net jobs over the 
past fifteen years; create more than half of the nonfarm private gross domestic 
product; hire 40% of high-tech workers; make up 97.3% of all identified exporters; 
and produced 30.2% of the known export value.
141
 
The effects of small business are also felt strongly in the patent industry as, 
according to a recent study performed by the Small Business Association, “small 
innovative firms obtained patents at a rate of 26.5 per hundred employees” from 
2002–06 and large innovative firms obtained patents at a rate of 1.7 per hundred 
employees.
142
 On average, “small innovative firms patent at a rate [sixteen] times 
higher than large innovative firms from a patents-per-employee perspective.”143 
Moreover, even in the smaller companies this is more prevalent, as “companies 
with fewer than 25 employees will have a higher patent-to-employee ratio on aver-
age than firms with 50 employees, which will in turn have a higher patent-to-
employee ratio than firms with 100 employees, and so on.”144 Thus, small busi-
nesses outperform larger businesses in patent issuance. 
Additionally, these patents issued to small firms are more technologically im-
portant than those issued to large corporations. Small firms are twice as likely to 
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http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs389tot.pdf. 
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 144. Anthony Breitzman & Diana Hicks, An Analysis of Small Business Patents by Industry and 
Firm Size, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY iii (Nov. 2008), available at 
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produce a patent that will be among the 1% most cited patents.
145
 Thus, in addition 
to producing more patents per employee, the patents issued are more technological-
ly important. 
Small businesses are also the primary stimulus of new job growth, as their in-
novation tends to be in “high tech, high growth industries, such as biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, information technology, and semiconductors.”146 While large 
businesses do, of course, innovate, they are more likely to create incremental ad-
vances in an industry to existing products, whereas the innovation from small firms 
is more likely to be a revolutionary advance.
147
 This puts valuable technology in the 
hands of the small companies, resulting in many large companies either buying 
these small companies or licensing innovations from them.
148
 This results in small 
firms being the “principal driver of new job growth,”149 as well as generating the 
“overwhelming majority of new high-paying American jobs.”150 
This dominance in patent efficiency per employee, technologically important 
patents, and technologically revolutionizing advances that small businesses have 
compared to large corporations is important because patent rights are “vital to pro-
moting innovation and creativity,” which are “essential element[s] of our free-
enterprise, market-based system.”151 This promotion of innovation, in turn, is “a 
primary driver of U.S. economic growth and national competitiveness.”152 Thus, 
small entities’ excellence in the patent industry, as well as their ability to spur in-
novation at a greater level than large corporations, has helped make the “innovation 
economy of the United States . . . the envy of the world.”153 
B. America Versus the Rest of the World 
The U.S. has the most innovative economy in the world… 
Gary Lauder
154
 
 
It is clear that the “innovation economy of the United States is the envy of the 
world,” as “[o]ur venture capital industry accounts for more than 85% of the 
world’s venture capital.”155 Indeed, opposed to economies such as Europe’s, that 
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“suffer[] from extraordinary corporate rigidity,” the U.S. economy allows start-ups 
to break into the corporate scene.
156
 In contrast, Europe’s economy stifles innova-
tion, which is “why Europe has failed to produce a Bill Gates.”157 In the second 
half of the twentieth century, Europe produced only twelve Fortune 500 Companies 
while the U.S. produced fifty-one, and other emerging countries produced forty-
six.
158
 Young companies in the U.S. simply have an easier time emerging than 
similar companies in Europe.
159
 Moreover, while many companies are created in 
European countries, the U.S. economy allows start-up companies to grow much 
faster than their European counterparts.
160
 The U.S. patent system is one of these 
enabling factors.
161
 
C. How First-to-File Will Hurt Small Entities 
We believe that much of the legislation is a disincentive to inventiveness, 
and stifles new businesses and job growth by threatening the financial re-
wards available to innovators in [the] U.S. industry. 
John Meredith & Keith Grzelak
162
 
 
One of the main policy questions regarding switching from first-to-file to 
first-to-invent is that patent priority will become a “race” to the patent office to file 
a patent application, which will favor large corporations over small companies and 
individual inventors.
163
 The basic idea is that the large corporations, which have 
more resources, such as more lawyers and money, will be able to get through the 
patent prosecution process faster than their smaller competitors, who have fewer 
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resources, and win the race to the patent office to gain patent priority.
164
 There are 
several ways large corporations will have a distinct advantage over small compa-
nies. 
The cost of filing patent applications is less of a concern for large corpora-
tions, as resources are less of a factor compared to small start-ups.
165
 Studies show 
that relatively smaller firms tend to report a significantly higher sensitivity to the 
costs of filing and enforcing patents, whereas the difficulties and costs of acquiring 
and enforcing patents is not salient for larger firms.
166
 Small companies must raise 
capital by presenting to investors or by slowing their design for a patent to put 
company money towards their patent prosecution. During this time, large compa-
nies are able to file an application much faster, regardless of who invented first, and 
gain priority.
167
 
Additionally, larger corporations have an advantage over small companies 
because they have more patent attorneys or agents as well as routinized patent pro-
cedures put in place for faster patent application.
168
 This corporate advantage will 
put “undue pressure on patent attorneys and agents to provide unreasonably fast 
service to their [small] clients” which will lead to “poor quality disclosures. . . [on 
smaller entities’] patent applications.”169 
These company capital and legal resource factors raise serious questions 
about the first-to-file system and its likely effect on small entities. While these 
questions and concerns are merely conjectural at the moment, many answers can be 
found in looking to other similar transitions taken by other countries. 
D. Caution from Canada 
In short, we find with some confidence that a shift to first-to-file from first-
to-invent results in a reduction of patenting by individual inventors rela-
tive to firms. 
David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner
170
 
 
Though the U.S. cannot yet see the effects the AIA will have on small busi-
nesses and inventors, a recent shift did occur in a highly-developed country compa-
rable to the U.S.171 In 1989, Canada changed their patent system from a first-to-
invent system to a first-to-file system.
172
 This switch serves as a great comparative 
tool to predict the effects the AIA will have on the U.S., as Canada has a very simi-
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lar patent system to that of the U.S., similar economic features, close geographic 
proximity, and shares a similar, integrated economy with the U.S.
173
 These similari-
ties make a comparison between Canada’s switch to first-to-file and the U.S.’s 
switch both possible and helpful in determining how the switch will affect small 
companies in the U.S. 
Several studies have been performed, giving much needed empirical evidence 
on how the switch from first-to-file and first-to-invent influences the level and dis-
tribution of incentive activity.
174
 Using information made available from the Cana-
dian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO)
175
 as the output and R&D spending as the 
input, these studies measured “inventive activity carried out by Canadians before 
and after the enactment” of the first-to-file system.176 Acknowledging that other 
factors besides the change of law can affect the results of the study and measuring 
innovativeness, the studies isolated possible confounding effects by focusing their 
analysis on inventive activity between certain dates
177
 or with techniques that con-
trol for these unwanted effects.
178
 After performing an empirical analysis on the 
data collected, the studies analyzed their results and came back with many conclu-
sions and observations,179 of which this report is concerned about the individual 
inventors versus large corporations patenting behavior. 
To test the idea of whether a shift in patent policy will hurt small entities, the 
studies examined the representation of individual inventors in the U.S. and Cana-
da.
180
 The data in Canada shows a “sharp decline in the fraction of individual in-
ventors, from 10.7% prior to the end of 1989 to 7.8% afterward.”181 In the U.S. “the 
proportion of individual inventors dropped slightly, from 17.4% to 16.5%.”182 Both 
of these trends show that the fraction of individual inventors following the Canadi-
an law change experienced a decline. Indeed, not only did Canadian small busi-
nesses witness a substantial decline in patenting in the U.S., but large corporations 
continued to experience substantial growth, making small inventors “lose ground” 
to them.
183
 The conclusions from studies have been consistent in their findings: 
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The divergence between small entities and large corporations in patenting 
after the Reforms supports the idea that a switch to a first-to-file system 
will result in relatively less inventive activity being carried out by inde-
pendent inventors as well as small businesses, and more being channeled 
through large corporations instead.
184
 
Additionally, not only did the switch have a negative impact on independent 
inventors and small firms, but “Canada’s adoption of a first-to-file system had vir-
tually no positive effect on its overall inventive activity.”185 Indeed, another result 
from the switch to first-to-file was that “[p]atents made by American inventors 
were, on average, of a higher value than those made by Canadians...”186 
Thus, Canada has shown the U.S. that the switch to first-to-file, while having 
many positive results, such as international harmonization and streamlining of pa-
tent priority, does come at a cost. This cost may not seem significant as the number 
of overall patent applications did not decrease, but small inventors have played an 
important role in the U.S. since its independence. Examples such as Thomas Edi-
son, Bill Gates, Yahoo!, and Google, Inc. illustrate that point.
187
 The patent switch 
might not hurt overall patent application numbers, but it will significantly affect the 
people who have kept us at the forefront of the world’s technological advances. 
E. Lobbying the America Invents Act 
First inventors have the exclusive constitutional right to their inventions. 
This right extends to every citizen, not just those with deep pockets and 
large legal teams. A politicized patent system will further entrench those 
very powerful interests with deep pockets and lots of lobbying offices… 
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur
188
 
When looking to see who will benefit from a controversial bill, determining 
who the main lobbyists for the passing of the bill is often the best way to determine 
who the bill may benefit and who the bill may harm. In November of 2011, First 
Street Research Group, an association that “reviews, investigates and analyzes the 
data in First Street [and the lobbying industry] to publish exclusive reports [and 
analysis] on the people and organizations influencing policy in Washington, 
DC.,”189 published a report on the lobbying of the America Invents Act190 Lobbying 
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for the AIA in the House of Representatives involved 318 organizations and over 
1,000 lobbyists who combined to spend an amount of over $400 million in efforts 
to gain Congressional support.
191
 Lobbying in the Senate was similar with 289 or-
ganizations spending over $390 million in 2011 for their lobbying activity and over 
1,000 lobbyists, including former members of Congress and other federal govern-
ment workers.
192
 While many of the organizations involved in the lobbying are to 
be expected, considering the clear large corporation benefits the AIA gives, there 
will be some unexpected parties involved in the lobbying. 
The organizations are ranked by the top five in quarterly spending in the fol-
lowing three areas: (a) the bill by amount spent lobbying, (b) the bill by number of 
lobbyists hired, and (c) the USPTO by amount spent lobbying.
193
 The top five or-
ganizations that lobbied the bill by amount spent are as follows: (1) Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S.A. at $10,010,000; (2) National Association of Realtors at 
$7,120,000; (3) AT&T Services, Inc. and its affiliates at $6,840,000; (4) General 
Electric Company and its subsidiaries at $6,770,000; and (5) Comcast Corporation 
at $5,820,000.
194
 The top organizations who lobbied using the highest number of 
lobbyists are as follows: (1) Independent Community Bankers of America with 
eighteen lobbyists spending $1,585,000; (2) Securities Industry and Financial Mar-
kets Association with sixteen lobbyists spending $1,370,000; (3) AT&T Services, 
Inc. and its affiliates with fifteen lobbyists spending $6,840,000; (4) Yahoo! Inc. 
with fifteen lobbyists spending $60,000; (5) Hewlett-Packard Company with fifteen 
lobbyists spending $60,000; and (6) Research in Motion with fifteen lobbyists 
spending $50,000.
195
 Finally, the top five organizations that lobbied the USPTO by 
amount spent are as follows: (1) Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. at 
$10,890,000; (2) General Electric Company and its subsidiaries at $8,590,000; (3) 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America at $4,690,000; (4) Pfizer, 
Inc. at $3,790,000; and (5) National Association of Broadcasters at $3,240,000.
196
 
Other members of the coalition for the patent reform, are companies such as BP, 
Caterpillar, Dow Chemical Company, DuPont, Motorola, and Texas Instruments.
197
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While this report is not as expansive as it could be, it does show that many of the 
largest lobbyists and spenders in support of the AIA are in fact large, international 
corporations. While this does not necessarily mean the law will hurt small busi-
nesses, it does shed light on who expects the greatest benefit. 
F. AIA Mitigating Effects on Small Businesses 
Small businesses are not the only entities that realize the harmful effects of 
the first-to-file provision, as the drafters of the AIA drafted provisions that attempt-
ed to mitigate the obvious harmful effects and disadvantages it puts on small enti-
ties. 
The most obvious part of the AIA recognizing the harmful effect it will have 
on small entities is found in the language of the AIA itself, assuring that Congress 
and the new patent system “should promote industries to continue to develop new 
technologies that spur growth and create jobs across the country which includes 
protecting the rights of small businesses and inventors from predatory behavior 
that could result in the cutting off of innovation.”198 While this text displays an 
honorable intent, the passing of the AIA itself will cause this predatory behavior 
that “could” result in the cutting off of innovation. 
The AIA requires the USPTO to conduct a “study on implementation” which 
requires the Director to report to Congress after conducting a four year study re-
garding “the manner in which this Act and the amendments made by this Act are 
being implemented” and on other aspects “with respect to patent rights, innovation 
to the United States, competitiveness of the United States markets, access by small 
businesses to capital for investment, and such other issues. . . .”199 This provision 
explicitly recognizes that there may be harmful effects on our economy, innova-
tiveness, and small businesses. 
A further study that the AIA requires the USPTO to conduct is intended to de-
termine how the Office “can best help small businesses with international patent 
protection. . . .”200 This report is due 120 days after the date of enactment of the 
AIA and the Director shall let Congress know his determination of whether a fund 
loan program, grant program, or neither should be established as well as giving any 
recommendations the Director may have.
201
 
Another commonly cited provision by proponents of the AIA with respect to 
the effects on small businesses is the provision establishing the “micro-entity” cat-
egory.
202
 The AIA has several different ways to qualify as a “micro-entity.”203 
What this small entity classification gives the applicants in this category is a fifty 
percent fee reduction for “filing, searching, examining, issuing, appealing, and 
maintaining patent applications and patents.”204 The AIA also adds a category for 
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applicants now referred to as “micro entities” who get a seventy-five percent reduc-
tion in fees.
205
 This reduction in fees undoubtedly will help small entities, but it still 
does not solve the glaring issue of their ability to compete with the pace at which 
the larger corporations will be able to file. Moreover, the real expenses involved in 
filing a patent application come from the $5,000 to $10,000 in attorney’s fees, not 
the $915 it costs a micro entity in fees to file with the USPTO.
206
 
Two final provisions that seem to have the most hope for small businesses are 
found in Sections 28 and 32 of the AIA. Section 28 creates a “Patent Ombudsman 
Program for Small Business Concerns,” or, as proponents of the Act call the pro-
gram, “a champion at the PTO” who looks out for their interests and helps small 
businesses secure patents.
207
 Section 32 of the AIA, institutes a pro bono program 
that requires the Director of the PTO to “work with and support intellectual proper-
ty law associations across the country in the establishment of pro bono programs 
designed to assist financially under-resourced independent inventors and small 
businesses.”208 This last provision seems to understand that the best way to mitigate 
the harmful effects of the first-to-file system imposed by the AIA is to attempt to 
level the playing field. If small businesses are able to have proficient counsel at the 
beginning of their patent obtaining efforts, it will level the playing field at least 
some with the large corporations who have the counsel from the beginning as well. 
This, along with other ideas addressed and considered,
209
 are the types of actions 
that need to be made in order to put small businesses on the same playing field as 
they were before the passing of the AIA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By relocating the fulcrum under the risk-reward balance, the AIA under-
mines inventors’ and investors’ confidence that undertaking the process of 
invention and product development is worthwhile. This will harm early 
stage innovation, hurt small business, and “ultimately jeopardize Ameri-
ca’s ability to create new jobs.” 
Jennifer L. Case
210
 
 
The signing of the America Invents Act undoubtedly “will speed up the patent 
process”211 and harmonize our system with the rest of the world, but at what cost? 
Whether the change from first-to-invent to first-to-file “will help American entre-
                                                          
 205. Id. 
 206. Brad Fach, How much does it cost to patent an idea?, PATENTFILE.ORG, 
http://www.patentfile.org/howmuchdoesitcosttopatentanidea/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 207. AIA § 28; 157 CONG. REC. H4424 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar 
Smith). 
 208. AIA § 32, 125 Stat. at 340. 
 209. See infra Part V. 
 210. Case, supra note 11, at 77. 
 211. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs 
America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New 
Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim. 
226 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
preneurs and businesses bring their inventions to market sooner,”212 or if that is 
offset by a loss of innovation by the simplification of the priority rules, is a ques-
tion that can only be answered with time. However, comparing our innovative 
economy and patent system to the rest of the world and observing how a similar 
change affected Canada, it seems that this change will hurt both innovation and the 
chances of small inventors to break into the market.
213
 This ability for small inven-
tors to break into the corporate structure is what has long made America unique and 
helped great industry innovator’s such as Steve Jobs and Bill Gates emerge. If the 
Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the AIA, despite the numerous ar-
guments against it, small inventors will be the ones that have to find ways to re-
main competitive and keep in mind ways to cost-effectively maximize their patent 
protection. 
However, there are some ways that inventors can mitigate the effects of the 
AIA themselves, such as simply becoming familiar with the patent process. Appli-
cants can save a lot of time and money with even small amounts of knowledge of 
the patent process, such as knowing deadlines to avoid fees and having to get ex-
tensions. This will also allow applicants to minimize the roles of their patent firms 
or attorneys by allowing them to perform much of the process of filing without the 
help of their attorney. 
Another very useful tool for applicants to utilize is a provisional patent appli-
cation. A provisional application allows the filer to establish an initial priority date, 
while buying time to raise capital from investors. 
While this may be against public policy, one of the best ways to mitigate the 
first-to-file system is to move our patent system more towards a trade secret until 
one is ready to patent. It is true that one cannot benefit from their invention during 
this period of secrecy, but the inventor could continue to perfect their invention and 
gain investors until such time that they are ready to file. 
Finally, arguably the most realistic way for small inventors to mitigate the 
harmful effects of the AIA that they will experience is to utilize Section 32 of the 
AIA, which institutes a pro bono program.
214
 The director of the USPTO will be the 
one instituting this program, and not only could this pro bono program utilize intel-
lectual property law associations from across the country to assist small business-
es,
215
 but the program could also successfully enlist the work of second and third 
year law students pursuing a career in patent law. Many law students pursuing a 
career in patent law have passed the patent bar by their second or third year to make 
themselves more attractive to employers. Additionally, many law schools have 
mandatory pro bono hours that their students must complete as a prerequisite for 
graduation.
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work under the supervision of experienced patent attorneys to fulfill their pro bono 
hours would benefit both groups of people and help mitigate the effects the AIA 
will have on small businesses and inventors. 
In conclusion, with the passing of the AIA, the burden of trying to stay com-
petitive with the large corporations, who were able to afford lobbying for the Act in 
Congress, falls on the small businesses themselves. If the Supreme Court upholds 
the provision of the AIA instituting a first-to-file system, despite the language of 
the Constitution and 220 years of established law showing first-to-file is unconsti-
tutional, the uniquely American system of patent law that has placed us on the fore-
front of innovation will be erased and successfully streamline our system and har-
monize the U.S. with the rest of the world who has trailed us in innovation. While 
the AIA does resolve many of the problems with our current system, it does so in a 
way that will also create a new problem: reducing the place for American ingenui-
ty, which has long made the U.S. patent system unique and coveted. 
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